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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. CASE NO. 168~ /&8"56 
DELBERT DEAN LODDY, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
The State of Utah 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case is a criminal prosecution which was initiated 
in Tooele County and had proceeded through preliminary ex-
amination in the Sixth Circuit Court and was pending for 
trial in the Third District Court in and for Tooele County 
on an Information filed by the Tooele County Attorney, charging 
the defendant with Theft, a Felony of the Second Degree in 
violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 404, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, as amended. The incident giving rise to the 
prosecution occurred on September 29, 1975 near Delle in 
Tooele County. 
DISPOSITION IN THE DISTRICT COURT 
Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss whj_ch was heard before 
the Third District Court in and for Tooele County with 
-1-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
David B. Dee, District Judge presiding on December 13, 1979. 
After hearing arguments on the Motion to Dismiss the Court 
made its Order granting defendant's motion and dismissing 
the Information with prejudice. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Pursuant to its right to appeal granted by Section 
77-39-4 (9), appellant requests that the Order of Dismissal 
be reversed and the Information be reinstated. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On September 29, 1975 an incident involving a theft of 
copper wire belonging to Mountain Bell Telephone Co., occurred 
near Delle in Tooele County. On September 30, 1975 William 
Warren Holton was arrested and charged in a Complaint filed 
in Tooele City Court with the conunission of the theft. On 
April 11, 1978, after a series of continuances, some of 
which occurred because Mr. Holton failed to appear and his 
whereabouts were unknown, Mr. Holton appeared in the Sixth 
Circuit Court for a preliminary examination. Pursuant to a 
negotiated plea, the State moved to amend the Complaint to 
charge Attempted Theft, a Felony of the Third Degree. This 
Motion was granted and Mr. Holton was bound over to appear 
in District Court that same day. Mr. Holton appeared in 
District Court and entered a plea of guilty to the Information 
filed charging him with Attempted Theft, a Third Degree 
Felony. on April 13, 1978 Mr. Holton gave a statement to the 
Tooele county Sheriff in which he implicated the defendant 
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herein, Delbert Dean Loddy, in the offense which had occurred on 
September 29, 1975. After the statement was transcribed, a 
Complaint was filed in the Tooele City Court on June 15, 
1978 charging Delbert Dean Loddy with the theft which had 
occurred on September 29, 1975 and a warrant for Mr. Loddy's 
arrest was issued. Mr. Loddy was arrested in Wyoming in 
June, 1979 and waived extradition from Campbell County, 
Wyoming on June 22, 1979. From that date on, there were a 
number of delays and continuances of the trial, all at the 
defendant's request, until the date the Motion to Dismiss 
was heard and the Order of Dismissal was entered, which 
resulted in this appeal. 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Whether the Order dismissing the Information with 
prejudice set forth the reasons therefore with sufficient 
specificity? 
2. Whether the defendant's right to Due Process of Law 
under the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution 
has been violated? 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE ORDER OF THE DISTRICT COURT DISMISSING 
THE INFORMATION WITH PREJUDICE DID NOT SET 
FORTH THE REASONS FOR THE DISMISSAL WITH 
SUFFICIENT SPECIFICITY 
In this case after listening to the arguments of counsel 
the District Court Judge made the following order; 11 Well, 
there's a question of delay within delay. In any event the 
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Court having heard the Motion, arguments and reviewed the 
file makes a determination. The Motion to Dismiss is granted 
with prejudice.'' (Transcript of Hearing on Motion to 9ismiss, 
pages 10-11). In the written Order of Dismissal, which the 
District Judge signed, the following language appears, "Based 
upon the pleadings and documents in the file and the Affidavit 
of Robert Van Seiver and the Court having heard the arguments 
of counsel, it is hereby ordered that the Information in the 
above entitled case be and hereby is dismissed with prejudice." 1 
(Order of Dismissal). 
Section 77-51-4, U.C.A., 1953, as amended, provides: 
The Court may, either of its own motion or upon the 
application of the County Attorney, in furtherance of justice 
order an action, information or indictment to be dismissed. 
The reasons for the dismissal must be set forth in an order 
entered upon the minutes. 
In Salt Lake City v. Hanson, 19 Utah 2d 32, 425 P. 2d 773, 
the Supreme Court of Utah considered the question of whether 
or not a District Court Judge acted properly in dismissing 
seven cases which had been appealed from City Court to District 
court. The Orders of Dismissal contained no statement of the 
reason for dismissal. In considering this issue the Court 
referred to Section 77-51-4 Utah Code Annotated. The 
Court held: 
"Because of the nature of criminal proceedings, 
and because they are in the interest of and for 
the protection of the public, there is a sound basis 
-4-
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in public policy for requiring the judge who assumes 
the serious responsibility of dismissing a case to 
set forth his reasons for doing so in order that all 
may know what invokes the Court's discretion and 
whether its action is justified." 
The Court reversed the District Court's Order of Dimissal. 
Hanson, supra at 35 and 775. The Court cited a California 
case, People v. Winters, 342 P2d 538 as authority for the 
above stated proposition. The Winters case involved a 
situation where a Municipal Court Judge in Los Angeles on his 
own motion and in the interest of justice, dismissed ten pro-
secutions for gambling initiated by the State of California. 
On appeal, the Superior Court Appellate Department reversed 
the dismissals. The Court cited California Penal Code Section 1385 
which is very similar to Section 77-51-4 u.c.A. In speaking of 
that section the Court said: 
"Penal Code Section 1385 requires that the minute 
order must set forth the reasons for dismissal. We 
have not authority to disregard this requirement or 
to hold that it is merely directory." 
The Court further stated: 
"As was said in People v. Disperat~, ... It is to 
be observed that this is no "technical" objection to 
the proceedings, as the term technical is commonly 
understood, but it relates to an important rule of 
procedure which the Legislature has provided for the 
guidance of the Courts, and the omission to observe 
it cannot be held to be innocuous without an invasion 
of the authority of a co-ordinate branch of the 
government. If the practice of which complaint is 
made is to be continued, it is manifest that great 
abuse is likely to follow, more dangerous to society 
than even the acquittal of the guilty. 
A judge dismissing criminal charges without trial, 
upon his own motion, must record his reasons so that 
all may know why this great power was exercised, and 
such public declaration is indeed a purposeful re-
straint, lest magistial discretion sweep away the 
government of laws." Winters supra at 542. 
-5-
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In the present case the Court did not specify the reasons 
for dismissal either in its order as spoken from the bench 
or in the written order which it signed. Nor is a reason 
for the dismissal given in the minute entry. It is submitted 
therefore, that the Court erred in not following the procedure 
set by the legislature, which must be followed. 
POINT II 
THE APPLICABLE FOUR YEAR STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS HAD NOT EXPIRED 
The facts of this case are that the criminal charges which 
were filed against the defendant, were filed before the statute 
of limitations had expired. The incident giving rise to the 
charge occurred on September 29, 1975. The charge of Theft, a 
Felony of the Second Degree, was filed on June 15, 1978, some 
two years and nine months later and well within the applicable 
four year statute of limitations provided by Section 76-1-302 
U.C.A. 
Section 76-1-304 U.C.A., 1953 as amended, provides that: 
"The period of limitations does not 
run against any defendant during any period 
of time he is out of the State following 
the commission of an offense." 
In his Memorandum in Opposition to Sununary Disposition, 
counsel for defense points out that the defendant was outside 
of the State of Utah from February 19, 1977 to December 18, 
1977, a period of ten months. It is also stated that from 
M~rch of 1978 up until the time of his arrest, Mr. Loddy was 
living in Colorado and then Wyoming. The defendant was 
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therefore out of the State of Utah for 13 of the 33 months 
which expired between the date of the incident and the 
filing of the complaint. 
When the time during which the defendant was outside of 
the State of Utah is accounted for, only 20 months of the 
applicable four year limitation period had expired and 28 
more months remained before the statute of limitations would 
have expired. 
POINT III 
THE DEFENSE DID NOT PRODUCE EVIDENCE 
AT THE HEARING ON THE MOTION TO DISMISS 
WHICH WOULD ESTABLISH A VIOLATION OF 
HIS RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL OR HIS 
14th AMENDMENT RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS 
OF LAW 
At the hearing on the defendant's motion to dismiss, 
the defense asserted as the basis for the motion that the 
defendant's right to due process of law had been violated by 
the delay between the date the incident occurred and the date 
the complaint was filed. In his Memorandum in Opposition to 
Summary Disposition, defense counsel also raised the issue 
of a denial of the defendants right to a speedy trial as 
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment and Section 77-1-8 (6) U.C.A. 
It is the position of the State that neither of these claims 
are valid in this case. 
With respect to the argument that the defendant has 
been denied a speedy trial, the law is clear that that right 
does not apply until one becomes an "accused". The case 
United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 30 LEd 2d 468, 92 
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S. Ct. 455, the United States Supreme Court declined to extend 
the reach of the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of a speedy trial 
to the period prior to arrest. The case is very illustrative 
of the type of problem dealt with in this case. 
In Marion, the facts were as follows: The defendants-
appellees were indicted on April 21, 1970 on 19 counts alleging 
that their business known as Allied Enterprises, Inc. had been 
fraudulently conducted and involved misrepresentations, alteratic 
of documents, and deliberate nonperformance of contracts. The 
period covered by the indictment was March 15, 1965, to February 
1967; with the earliest specific act allegedly occurring on 
September 3, 1965 and the latest on January 19, 1966. The 
appellees filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, 
"for failure to conunence prosecution of the 
alleged offenses charged therein within such time 
as to afford them (their rights) to due process 
of law and to a speedy trial under the Fifth and 
Sixth Amendments to the Constitution of the 
United States." Marion, supra at 404 U.S. 309, 
30 LEd 2d 472. 
No evidence was submitted, but the Court noted that from ~e 
motion and the arguments of counsel it appeared that Allied 
had been subject to a Federal Trade Commission cease-and-desist 
order since February 6, 1967 and that the U.S. Attorney's office 
was investigating Allied and other firms by October of that 
same year. The U.S. Attorney's office requested certain 
Allied records, which were delivered in the summer of 1968. 
The Grand Jury by which the appellees were indicted was 
impaneled in September of 1969 and appellees were informed 
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of the Grand Jury's concern with them in March of 1970. The 
indictment was then handed down in April of 1970. The 
appellants moved to dismiss on grounds that the indictment was re-
turned an unreasonably oppressive and unjustifiable time after the 
alleged offenses. They argued that the indictment required 
them to remember specific acts and conversations which occurred 
several years before. They also argued that the delay was due 
to the indifference or negligence of the U. S. Attorney in 
investigating the case and presenting it to a Grand Jury. 
The Court noted that no specific prejudice was claimed or 
demonstrated. The District Court dismissed the indictment 
for lack of speedy prosecution and remarked that the defense 
or the case must have been seriously prejudiced by the delay 
of at least three years in bringing the prosecution. On 
appeal the United States Supreme Court reversed the dismissal 
and addressed the Sixth Amendment speedy trial issue and 
the Fifth Amendment due process issue. 
With respect to the issue of whether or not the delay in 
initiating the prosecution violated the a?pellees Sixth 
Amendment right to a speedy trial the Court held that it 
did not. The Court said: 
"The Sixth Amendment provides that in all 
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right to a speedy and public trial. .. " On 
its face, the protection of the Amendment is 
activated only when a criminal prosecution has 
begun and extends only to those persons who have 
been "accused" in the course of that prosecution. 
Those provisions would seem to afford no pro-
tection to those not yet accused, nor would they 
-9-
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The Due Process reasoning of the Supreme Court is applicabl1 
to this case even though this case involves the Due Process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment whereas the Marion case dealt 
with the Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment. Hibben v. 
~mith, 191 U.S. 310, 48 LEd 195, 24 S. Ct. 88. 
In the case before the Court the defense alleges a violati~ 
of the defendant's Due Process rights. At the hearing on the 
Motion to Dismiss, the only evidence presented was Mr. Van Sci~: 
Affadavit. There was no evidence presented which in any way 
demonstrated that Mr. Leddy had been prejudiced in his ability 
to present a defense. There was no evidence presented which 
demonstrated an intentional delay by the State for the purpose 
of gaining a tactical advantage. There was no evidence presente' 
which would indicate that the State had any intent to file 
charges against the defendant until after the statement was 
obtained from Mr. Holton in 1978. The distinction must be 
drawn between the passage of time and delaying by the State. 
The Marion case dealt with preaccusation delay by the govern-
ment. Webster defines delay as follows: 
" 1. to put off to a future time; post-
pone. 2. to make late; slow up; detain -- vi. 
to stop for a while; linger ... " Websters New 
World Dictionary, Second College Edition, 1974, 
pp. 372. 
The word delay, as can be seen, connotes some kind of 
intent. In the Marion case, the Court spoke in terms of 
intentionally delaying to gain some tactical advantage. 
Marion, supra 404 U.S. at 325, 30 LEd 2d at 481-82. The record 
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here does not demonstrate that the State delayed. What it does 
show is that there was a passage of time between the incident 
and the filing of the complaint. Nor does the record show 
that the State allowed the time to pass in order to gain a 
tactical advantage over the defendant or to harass him. In 
short, the defense has not demonstrated either prejudice to 
their ability to defend or a intentional delay by the State 
to gain a tactical advantage over the defendant. There was 
therefore, no basis for the Information to be dismissed. 
CONCLUSION 
A review of the record in this case demonstrates that there 
was error conunitted by the District Court on the points 
presented. The District Court did not follow the mandate of 
Section 77-51-4 and state its reasons for dismissing the case 
in its order, on the record or in the minutes. Nor was there 
any showing by the defense of facts which would justify the 
dismissal of the case. Neither the defendant's Sixth Amendment 
right to a speedy trial or his Fourteenth Amendment right to 
due process of law have been violated by the passage of time 
in this case. The prosecution was instituted much before the 
applicable statute of limitations had expired. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this I,~ day of April, 1980. 
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QMWfdri~ 
RONALD L. ELTON 
Too:~nty Att~--r~n~~-y-=--~--;JJ,NE G~ 
Deputy Tooele County Attorney 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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